



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

NSF: CO: CUBA

ANTELICATIVE CELERAL

5 DEC 1962

LINGRADEN FOR: The Honorable Moleonge Bundy Special Assistant to the President for National Scourity Affairs

At the close of the Emportive Committee Meeting last night, I reised the question of courses of action he should follow if the Orban SAM sites are made operational and a U-2 is shot.dom. This question has been considered and the consensus seems to be that in such an eventuality, we will be obliged to take out the SM! site or perhaps several S. Sites. There appeared no difference of opinion among those in attendance at the meeting last night or previous meetings when I raised this question concerning the policy.

However, as you said, the implementation of the "policy" was another matter and perma s it would be more difficult to "seize the nettle" in such assumed circumstance than it is to agree among ourselves as to what should be done.


I continue to be disturbed over this situation as I feel that there is a strong possibility of such a confrontation as soon as the IL-26's are all removed. In this connection, I find it significant that in. Runnetsov advised Governor Stavenson with regard to the number of IL-28's to be shipped on each of several ships, the ports and the dates of departure. This seems to indicate to be that the Soviets are about to "drop the curtain" on one thase of the Suban problem.

Other indications of their intentions have appeared recently. On Londay I gave you a note reporting (by Stevenson) [Skoyan's statements that Whe had succeeded in maintaining a Socialist 'communistcontrolled state in Cuba."









I feel there is a very strong possibility that we will soon face a situation where the Soviets will first warn us against further overflights, indicate that their SAI sites are in operation, and if we persist will destroy one or more U-2's. Action by us of a type planned and mentioned last night could, therefore, involve a military operation against announced Soviet controlled and operated bases and thus involve action against Soviet soldiers.

This therefore is quite possibly the situation that we will face. It will not be action against "Cuben forces" in disguise; it will be action against Soviet forces and this may possibly be announced to us in advance. I bring this up because I think the possibility must be given serious thought at this time and we might devise diplomatic noves which would either forestall such a confrontation or, alternatively, a pronouncement made now might so indicate our intentions that the confirmation will not occur.

JUHI A. MOCCIVE





## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

## OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

5 DEC 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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[Excised]

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John A. McCone Director